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THE COMMON LAW OF NON-DISCLOSURE
IN GUYANESE INSURANCE LAW
RITA PERSAUD*
INTRODUCTION
It is intended in this article to review the various aspects of the
principle of non-disclosure in Insurance Law which arose in the recently
reported Guyanese case of Walter Pillay v. Guyana and Trinidad Mutual
Life Assurance Co. Ltd.'
In Pillay, the deceased who held a private student's pilot licence
2
applied to the defendant company for an insurance policy on his life
with double indemnity and total disability benefits. In completing the
proposal form upon which the policy was issued, the deceased failed to
disclose that he was a student pilot and had actually flown as a pupil on
various occasions before the contract of insurance was entered into.
Again, in the proposal form the deceased was required to say whether
he had any intention of going into the interior of the country, and whether
he had any intention of serving with the Army, Navy or Air Force. To
all these questions, the deceased answered in the negative. After the policy
was issued the deceased went on a solo flight and was killed in a crash.
On a claim under the policy, the insurance company sought to repudiate
liability.
The issues arising out of this case as Boilers, C.J. of the Supreme
Court of Guyana saw them were: (1) whether the fact that the deceased
was learning to fly at the time the proposal was made was a material
fact to the insurance policy in question; and (2) whether the questions
in the proposal form had in essence limited the deceased's common law
duty of disclosure.
It was held by the learned Chief Justice that:
(i) The principles of English law relating to fire and life in-
surance prevail in Guyana.
*L.L.B. (U.W.I.), 1973; Certificate of Legal Education (1975) Hugh Wooding
Law School; Barrister-at-Law (1975) (Guyana).
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(ii) The deceased's flying activity was a material fact to the
issuing of the policy.
(iii) The effect of the questions asked in the proposal form was
sufficient to alert the assured to his flying activity, which he
ought properly to have disclosed.
(iv) The "basic clause" by which the assured warrants the answers
in the proposal and Medical Examiner's form to be "the basis
of the Contract", did not limit the proposer's common law duty
to disclose all material facts within his knowledge.
(v) Further, the questions asked in the proposal form did not
amount to a waiver of the common law duty of disclosure
a principle not to be easily presumed.
COMMENTARY
In Guyana the law regulating insurance business is governed by the
Insurance Act of 1970.1 This Act sets up the machinery for the administra-
tion of insurance business in the country. In short, it regulates the process
of registration, the winding up of insurance companies and the Association
of Underwriters. It does not make provision for the substantive law
governing insurance and the problem which arises therefore, is to ascertain
first and foremost, the source of the law in the event circumstances arise
involving as in the instant case, substantive principles of insurance law.
It would appear then that in the absence of statutory enactment resort
may be had to the common law. At this point also, it becomes necessary
to find out why the Guyanese student of law would resort to the common
law for an answer to a legal problem.
The answer to that question is not far-fetched. By virtue of s. 13 of
the Civil Law Act: 4 "in every suit, action, and cause having reference
to questions of fire and life assurance which are henceforth brought in
the High Court, or in any other competent Court of this country, the law
administered for the time being in the High Court of Justice in England,
so far as that law is not repugnant to, or in conflict with any Act now in
force in Guyana, shall be the law to be administered by the High Court
or other competent Court."
Section 2(b) of the Civil Law Act also provides that the common
law of England shall be the common law of Guyana.
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It is therefore not surprising that the issues in this case which
revolve around the common law duty of disclosure of material facts on
the part of the insured and waiver of such duty by the insurer in
relation to insurance contracts, are accordingly decided on the relevant
common law principles.
Basis of the Duty
Under the general principle of contract law the parties are expected
to act in good faith but they are not bound to tell the other all the facts
relating to the transaction. 5 The common law position is simply caveat
emptor.
A contract of insurance, however, operates on a different basis. It
is founded essentially on the basis that the parties will treat each other
with utmost good faith -a duty required of the parties throughout the
transaction - often expressed in the phrase uberrima fides.
This fundamental principle of insurance law is clearly stated by Lord
Mansfield, C.J. in Carter v. Boehm6 and further amplified by Jessel, M.R.
in London Assurance v. Mansel7 where the Master of the Rolls observed
".. . whether it is life, or fire, or marine assurance, I take it good faith
is required in all cases." This principle is now well established at common
law.'
By the operation of this principle it is deemed that the insured alone
possesses full knowledge of all facts material to the risk which he wishes
to place with the insurer and the law therefore requires him to show
uberrima ide. So that if the insured knows of any circumstances that may
influence the insurer's opinion as to the risk he is to undertake, and as
to whether he will take it, or what premium he will charge if he does
take it, the insured must state what he knows. Consequently, there is an
obligation on the insured to disclose all material facts known to him,
9
otherwise, the contract may be rescinded at the option of the insurer.
10
While there is no duty on the insured to disclose facts which he does not
know or could not reasonably be expected to know,11 he must disclose
those facts which he ought to know. 12
Material Facts
In the instant case the Court has stated the law 3 that insurance is a
contract uberrima fide and requires full disclosure of such material facts
as are known to the insured. In order to ascertain what is a material fact
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in the circumstances, Bollers, C.J. applied the test contained in the Marine
Insurance Act, 1906 (U.K.),14 which states: "every circumstance is
material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in
fixing the premium or determining whether he will take the risk."
Although that Act makes provision for marine insurance it would
appear that this test is applicable to all classes of insurance15 by virtue
of the fact that s.18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act effectively enacted
the common law definition of the subject. 16 But most often the courts
refer to that section in every branch of insurance law, as if the Act
applies with equanimity in every insurance case involving material facts
without stating that all the section did was to re-define and codify the
principles enunciated by case law. Apart from applying this statutory
definition in Pillay's Case, Bollers, C.T had previously applied it in
order to, ascertain what would amount to a material fact in the circum-
stances in Marks v. First Federation Insurance Co.17
Having now established that the definition is applicable to Guyana
not by virtue of the U.K. enactment but by reason of common law prin-
ciples, it remains now to be discovered whether the judgment in Pillay's
Case is in accordance with common law authorities on the issue.
Examples of what the Courts regard as material facts in any given
branch of insurance law can be multiplied. Suffice however, to illustrate
with the following instances. In Schoolman v. Hall8 - a case of jewelry
insurance - it was held that the criminal record of the proposer was a
material fact which ought to have been disclosed. Again on a life policy
case,1 9 it was held that a minor kidney trouble and attacks of pharyngitis
which the proposer suffered from were material facts.
All facts are material which suggest that the proposed assured in
effecting the insurance is actuated by some motive and not merely by
ordinary prudence. The insured in one case20 insured his warehouse on
the very evening after the next-door shop had caught fire and spread
to the warehouse. In an action on the policy the jury found that the
insured should have disclosed the circumstances of the first fire. Con-
sequently, the insurance company was entitled to avoid the policy on the
ground of non-disclosure.
The consideration of what is a material facts also entails an under-
standing of the meaning of the expression "prudent insurer". This matter
was considered in Associated Oil Carrier Ltd. v. Union Insurance Society
of Canton2' where it was held that a prudent insurer is not taken to know
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the law. Dealing with this subject, Lord Atkin lucidly expressed the view
that: "There seems no reason to impute to the insurer a higher degree of
knowledge and foresight than that reasonably possessed by the more ex-
perienced and intelligent insurer carrying on business in that market at
that time".22
It is then clear that the test is an objective one and Boilers, C.J.
rightly pointed out in Mark's case23 that "the test to be applied, whether
a particular fact is one which ought to be disclosed, is not what the
assured thinks24 nor even what the insurer thinks25 but whether a prudent
and experienced insurer would be influenced in his judgment if he
knew of it."
Although the Court must rule, as a matter of law, whether a particular
fact is capable of being material and give direction as to the applicable
test, the decision whether a fact is material or not is essentially a question
of fact, dependent upon the matters proved in court.
In order to prove the materiality of facts expert witnesses may be
called, that is, persons "actually engaged in the occupation of insurer,
26
and medical men."' 27 Where the facts speak for themselves, of course, no
expert evidence is necessary. However, the facts do not always speak for
themselves.2 8 In such a case if no expert evidence is offered it means
that the Court may make use of its own knowledge as to whether a fact
is material or not. This is evidenced by the statement of Scrutton, J. in
a case where no expert evidence was tendered, ". . . I am therefore, left
to form my own judgment on the questions from such knowledge as I
have of insurance matters." 2
9
It is submitted that the real danger in this matter is that not every
judge has the necessary experience of the insurance business. Whereas
the principle enunciated by Scrutton, J. may have worked smoothly in
his own peculiar circumstances, based upon his wealth of experience in
commercial law in general, the principle, if of general application may
create bad precedents. Although there is no case on the point, the danger
inherent in the Scrutton principle can hardly be underestimated.
It must be pointed out, however, that the problem did not arise in
Piay since expert evidence by the Company's secretary was accepted by
the Court. The evidence was to the effect that it was a practice of the
Company in cases where the proposer was engaged in flying activities
to issue a policy at a higher premium with a "flying clause" attached.
2 9a
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On the basis of this expert evidence the learned Chief Justice rightly
found that the insured's flying activities would influence the judgment of
a prudent underwriter in fixing the premium or in determining whether
or not he would take the risk.
Non-Disclosure
Having ascertained that the deceased's flying activity was a material
fact, the next question is whether there was a non-disclosure of this fact.
The duty of making disclosure is not confined to such facts as are within
the actual knowledge of the assured. It extends to all material facts which
he ought to have known in the ordinary course of events.
In the Guyanese case of Marks v. First Federation Life Insurance Co.30
it was held by the Chief Justice that the non-disclosure of a material fact
avoided the policy. The material fact in that case was that the deceased
had been hospitalised five months before the policy was issued, but he
did not disclose that fact at the time the contract was being made.
Where the insured is engaged in peculiarly hazardous occupation
that ought to be disclosed, for example, where the proposer in a life policy
was described as a "gentleman" and he made no disclosure of the fact
that he occasionally drove cars in races, it was held that the insurers were
entitled to repudiate liability on the contract.31
In cases where the material fact is within the actual knowledge of
the proposer a distinction must be drawn between non-disclosure and
"concealment." 3 2 Strictly speaking concealment implies suppression of
something which it is the duty of the assured to bring specifically to
the notice of the insurer and not merely an inadvertent omission to
disclose. 33 If, on the other hand, the failure to disclose is not due to
design and the assured has no intention to deal otherwise than frankly
and fairly with the insurers, the term "non-disclosure" may be more
appropriate.
On this issue, Boilers, C.J. in Pillay was of the opinion that the mere
mention of aeronautic voyages in clause (1) together with the nature of
the question 5 (a) and (b) of the proposal form showed that the de-
ceased's flying activities were material fact which he ought properly to
have disclosed. Moreover, he stated that
the deceased in this case cannot be properly described as innocent,
as when he signed the proposal form two days after he had his
fifth flying lesson and roughly two months after obtaining his
student's pilot's licence his mind must have been adverted to
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the risk. Also the circumstances that he had held two policies
for comparatively small sums and in the midst of his flying
activities he sought to effect his policy for a larger sum seems
to raise the reasonable inference that he did so because he
realised that he had become engaged in a hobby which can only
be described as hazardous. 3
4
In effect, it would seem that there was a concealment of material facts.
'Basis Clause'
A policy may contain an express stipulation defining the duty of
disclosure and prescribing the manner in which it is to be performed.
35
The performance of the duty then becomes contractual3 6 and if it is not
performed, there is a breach of contract of insurance as distinguished
from a breach of the duty of good faith.
Such a stipulation is often referred to as the 'basis clause.' 37 Where
such a clause appears in the contractual document, that is, where he
warrants that the statements made by him are true, it is a condition
precedent the failure of which, either by fraud or innocent misrepresenta-
tion, 38 repudiates the insurance contract. Whether or not the representation
is immaterial becomes irrelevant. Lord Eldon put the matter succintly when
he said in Newcastle Fire Insurance Co. v. [acmorran:3 9
It is a first principle in the law of insurance, on all occasions
that where a representation is material it must be complied with,
if immaterial, that immateriality may be enquired into and
shown; but that if there is a warranty it is part of the contract
that the matter is such as it is represented to be. Therefore the
materiality or immateriality signifies nothing.
40
Thus in Dawsons v. Bonnin41 the proposer for an insurance of a
lorry against fire stated that it was kept at "46 Cadogan Street, Glasgow".
The proposal was made the basis of the contract. In fact the vehicle
was garaged at a farm outside of Glasgow and it was destroyed by fire.
In an action on the policy it was held by the House of Lords that the
insurers were entitled to repudiate liability because of the mistatement
by the proposer, even though it was not a material one.
It appears then that the effect of a 'basis clause' is to extend the
duty of disclosure and to require from the proposed insured that the
accuracy of all facts stated is more than that required by the duty of
good faith. Indeed Cohen, L.J. in Schoolman v. Hall said:
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While the insurers have stipulated that the answers to the fifteen
questions 'shall be the basis of the contract', that only has the
effect of preventing any argument as to the materiality of those
questions should dispute arise, but it does not relieve the proposer
of his general obligation at common law to disclose any material
fact which might affect the risk...42
Again, Bollers, C.J. was right in holding that the 'basis clause' did
not limit the proposer's common law duty of disclosure.
Waiver
The principle of waiver is simply this:
.. . if one party by his conduct leads another to believe that the
strict rights arising under the contract will not be insisted upon,
intending that the other should act on that belief, and he does
act on it, then the first party will not afterwards be allowed to
insist on the strict rights when it would be inequitable for him
to do So. 4 3
Waiver of information as to facts, prima facie material for the insurer
to know, is not to be inferred too readily. It is of great importance that
the general duty of disclosure should be maintained and not whittled away
by alleged waiver.44
In order to establish waiver by the insurers it must at least be shown
that they have received information such as would put an ordinary, careful
insurer on inquiry and they have nevertheless failed to make any such
inquiry. But merely to omit to make an inquiry, where there is nothing to
suggest the possibility or necessity of doing so, cannot he held to be
waiver.45
However, the extent to which questions asked have altered the common
law duty seems to be unsettled. Indeed, Professor Ivamy46 makes two
assertions which seem to contradict4 7 each other: (i) where questions
whether written or verbal are asked by the insurers, the assured's duty of
disclosure is to some extent altered; (ii) notwithstanding the questions,
the common law duty of disclosure remains, and the proposer must dis-
close material facts which are not covered by the questions.
Bollers, C.J., in deciding the issue of waiver, came to the conclusion
that Ivamy's second assertion represents the law, and that the only instance
where questions asked serve to define the limits of what is material is
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when requiring information of specific sort, thereby relieving the assured
of the duty of disclosing facts which are not within his scope. If the
question had not been asked though such facts would have to be dis-
closed by the assured in the ordinary discharge of his duty.4 8
The observations of Vaughan Williams, L.J. is pertinent here:
I think also that the insurance office may, by the requisition
for information of a specific sort, which it makes of the proposer,
relieve him partially from the obligation to disclose by an elec-
tion to make enquiries as to certain facts material to the risk to
be insured against itself.4 9
An example of the effect of questions requiring specific information
is to be found in Jester Barnes v. Licences and General Insurance Co.
Ltd.,50 where MacKinnon, J. said that if an insurance company had asked
a proposer the question "have you or your driver during the past five
years been convicted of any offence?" and the proposer had said "no,"
and that was true, he would have come without any hesitation to the
conclusion that the company was not entitled, after asking that question
and receiving that true answer, to take it to mean that he had been con-
victed eight years ago and that was a material fact. Consequently, if from
the question asked in a proposal form, it is plainly indicated that certain
matters are regarded by the insurers as material, the questions cannot
be answered merely to the letter. However correct the answers may be,
all information in which the insurers are interested must be given.51
The scope of the question asked depends on the language in which
it is framed 52 and partly on the circumstances to which it is intended to
relate. The statement must be considered as a whole and a fair and
reasonable construction must be given. If the statement is substantially
accurate, 53 a trivial mistatement 54 or an omission of immaterial details55
does not render it inaccurate. Thus, where the assured having two occupa-
tions is asked to state his occupation, his answer is not inaccurate because
he states one of them only and omits to state the other 56 unless the fact
that he has two occupations is material to the risk.5 7
On the question of fair and reasonable construction, Lord Shaw of
Dunfermline said:
In a contract of Insurance it is a weighty fact that the questions
are framed by the insurers and that if an answer is obtained
to such a question which is upon a fair construction a true answer,
it is not open to the insuring company to maintain that the
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question was put in a sense different from or more compre-
hensive than the proponent's answer covered . . .51
Thus in Connecticut Mutual Lile Assurance v. Moore"' a question
in the proposal for a policy of life assurance stated: "Have you had any
other illness, local disease or personal injury? And if so, of what nature,
how long since and what effect upon general health." The answer given
was "no." It was held that a reasonable construction must be put on
the question which must be assumed to refer to serious illness only.
Again, where a question in a proposal form for life assurance said,
"What medical men have you consulted? When? and What for?" it was
held that this did not mean that the insured had to give a list of all the
doctors she had seen in her life. She had only to give a list which was
sufficient for practical purposes. 6"
In deciding the issue in Pillay Bollers, C.J. said "whether the ques-
tion through their [sic] form is an invitation to the proposer to limit
himself to a particular subject matter, or to a particular ambit within
that subject-matter depends on the nature of the questions asked in the
proposal form."' 61 The learned Chief Justice was not prepared to accept
the submission that the circumstance of the present case fell within the
principle enunciated by Vaughan Williams, L.J. as already stated.
Furthermore, the Chief Justice did not agree that the questions asked
in the proposal form referred to flying and were sufficient to put the
insurer upon inquiry, since in so far as the insurer was concerned flying
activities alone could not have been implied from these questions. The
deceased could have travelled to the interior otherwise than by flying
or served in the Army, Navy or Air Force without flying.
It should also -be noted that the answers given to the questions, both
being in the negative, were not inconsistent.62 It is therefore not surprising
that Boilers, C.J. found that the answers given could not put the insurer
on inquiry. 63
However, it must be pointed out that the learned C.J. did not consider
in his judgment the plaintiff's submission that, the conduct of the insurers
in setting out the policy in terms of clause (1) were such that a reasonable
layman could infer that no other information was required. Clause (1)
of the proposal form signed by the deceased made it clear that the double
indemnity cover would cease to operate if the deceased came to his death
while engaged as a passenger or otherwise in an aeronautic voyage. The
deceased so dying, the double indemnity did not operate. Implicit in this,
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though, is the fact that the ordinary life cover would operate if the
deceased died as a passenger or otherwise in an aeronautic voyage.
Therefore, the very fact that the insurers excluded death of passengers
or otherwise in aeronautic voyages shows that any flying activity which
the deceased may engage in was recognised as a material fact in relation
to the double indemnity and ought to have put the insurer on guard to
ask further questions on flying with relation to the ordinary life cover.
The insurers asked no such question even though with respect to the
ordinary life cover they usually attached a flying clause before issuing
it to persons occupied in flying activities. How then would the insured
know of the practice of attaching a flying clause? It seems reasonable
for the insured to assume that the insurer having exempted flying ac-
tivities upon the double indemnity did not consider it material with
respect to the ordinary life cover.
It is submitted that this is an "appropriate case" whereby the common
law could have been moulded to suit the needs of our society. 64 In the
context of West Indian society it is unfair to the insured for an Insurance
Company to produce a proposal form like the one in question. That is,
one where the company's interest is protected by clause (1) while the
innocent insured is left to figure out which information not asked for
in the proposal form, must be given or else be faced with a void policy.
Or is the proposer required to consult an insurance, lawyer every time
he wishes to take out an insurance policy?
6
'
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Bollers, C.J. applied the strict common law
principles in coming to this decision which in effect places a heavy burden
upon the insured to disclose all material facts known to him while. on
the other hand it is reluctant to find that the insurer had waived this
common law duty. These strict principles would appear to suggest that
the common law in this area has developed in such a way that insurers are
inevitably favoured by its operation - a point fully substantiated by
case law.
There are however, expressions of sympathy for the insured by
judges66 who recognize the harshness of the operation of the common law
principles. But as these expressions stop short of bringing about any
change in the law, they can only be described as lip-service to this
perennial problem.
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A rather striking illustration6 7 of the above proposition becomes
crystal clear from the statement of Swift, J. in Mackay v. London &
General Insurance when he said:
I am extremely sorry for the plaintiff in this case. I think he
has been very badly treated, shockingly badly treated. They
have taken his premium. They have not been in the least bit
misled by the answers which he has made. They would never
have refused to take his money. But I cannot help the position.
Sorry as I am for him there is nothing that I can do to help
him. The law is quite plain. 68
In turn, some of the sympathetic pronouncements by judges in certain
instances have proved misleading as to what the law is. For instance, in
Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Morrison where no
question in the proposal form was directed as to whether the proposer
had failed to pass a driving test, Goddard, L.J. said:
. . . the underwriter exhibits to them (i.e. the proposer) a long
catechism in which he puts questions on matters which may
affect any proposer . . . and I cannot help thinking that if it
is material for the underwriter to know whether or not the
proposer has failed in a test he would ask the question. 69
In at least two instances Scrutton, L.J. made observations which were
purely obiter. In Newsholme Bros. v. Road Transport & General Ins. Co.
Ltd. he said:
The insurance companies also run the risk of the contention
that matters they do not ask questions about are not material,
for, if they were, they would ask questions about them.70
Again, in McCormick v. National Motor Accident Union Ltd. in
considering the circumstance where an insurer has not asked a question
about a particular fact in the proposal form the Lord Justice said:
Well there is a material fact which you did not ask a question
about, and as you did not ask a question about it you cannot
say that it was material and ought to have been disclosed. 71
As has been pointed out, the above statements of Scrutton, L.J. were
merely obiter dicta. But Professor Ivamy 72 seems to have treated them as
if they represented the law on the issue. After making his second asser-
tion, 73 to the effect that notwithstanding the questions asked the common
law duty still remained, he went further to say:
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If the insurance company does not ask a question about a
particular fact in the proposed form it runs a risk . . .74
It is submitted that the learned Professor's propositions, to say the
least, are not only contradictory but also confusing and one wonders
whether they represent the law. Propositions of law cannot be framed
around pronouncements made by the way, whereas the ultimate decisions
do not reflect them. The unsatisfactory nature of this branch of the law
is not in doubt; the dicta and the Professor's thesis heighten the problem.
In the United States the tendency has been to take the view that if
the assured answers all the questions put to him fully and frankly he
has no further duty of disclosure.75 But in the words of Mr. Justice Stone
in Stipitch v. Insurance Co.:
Concededly the modern practice of requiring the applicant for
life insurance to answer questions prepared by the insurer has
relaxed the rule to some extent, since information not asked for
is presumably deemed immaterial. But the reason for the rule
still obtains and with added force ... 76
Since the law in this area has been of the common law judges own
making, it is time they, the judges, stopped paying lip-service to the
problems which they have created and get down to finding solutions,
with a view to eradicating the injustice which has persisted in Insurance
Law to the detriment of the insured. As an analogy, one may take the
recent unanimous judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Stone v.
Reliance Mutual Insurance Society Ltd., where Lord Denning, M.R.
considered that in the circumstances:
. . . it would have been most unjust if the Company had been
allowed to repudiate liability . . .77
which is exactly what they have been allowed to do in previous cases.
In the absence of judicial creativity, it is hoped that the Legislature
can provide a fair and equitable solution to these problems. Meanwhile,
one finds that the legislators' pre-occupation has been with the statutory
regulation of insurance companies and the insurance business in general,
in apparent oblivion of the rigours of the substantive principles of
Insurance Law. 78
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3 No. 25 of 1970.
4 Cap. 6:01 Laws of Guyana, 1972.
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part of the vendor to disclose all the facts relating to the land in question. See
Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, (3ed.) at p.599. This common law
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goods, see s.15 of the Sale of Goods Act (as to implied conditions of fitness), Cap.
90:10, Laws of Guyana (1972).
6[1766] 3 Burr 1905 at p.1909 (a marine insurance case).
7[1879] 11 Ch.D 363 p. 3 6 7 .
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1OBrownlie v. Campbell [1880], 5 App. Cas. 925 at p.954 per Lord Blackburn.
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close what you do not know".
12Godfrey v. Britannic Assurance Co. Ltd. [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 515.
1 3See (1972) 18 WIR 220 at p.223.
14S.18(2).
15 Per Scott, L.J. in Locker and Woolf Ltd. v. Western Australia Insurance Co.
Ltd. [1936] 1 KB 408.
1 6See Rivas v. Gerussi [1880] 6 QBD 222 at p. 2 29, per Lord Esher; Tate v.
Hyslop [1885] 15 QBD 368 at p.379 per Lord Bowen.
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19Godfrey v. Britannic Assurance Co. Ltd., supra.
2 OBufe v. Turner [1815] 6 Taunt, 338.
21[1917] 2 KB 184.
22Ibid, at p.192. In some cases, the test adopted is that of the "reasonable
insurer." Ivamy submits that the words "reasonable" and "prudent" are interchange.
able. See his General Principles op.cit., p.112.
2 3Supra, note 17.
2 4 Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Morrison [1942]
2 KB 53 per MacKinnon, L.J. at p.6 0 .
2 5 Re Yager and Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. [1912] 108 L.T. 38 per Channel,
J. at P.44.
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2 6 Yorke v. Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. [1918] 1 KB 662 at p.6
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v. Poland [1922] 2 KB 364 and Trading Co. L. & J. Hoff v. De Rougemont [1929]
34 Com. Cos. 291. In both these cases evidence of underwriters were admitted.
27Godfrey v. Britannic Assurance Co. Ltd., supra, where the evidence of a doctor
was admitted.
2SGlicksman v. Lancashire and General Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925] 2 KB 593 at
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